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"POLITICAL OPINIONS" OF REFUGEES:
INTERPRETING INTERNATIONAL SOURCES
In many countries, persons feel compelled by conscience to resist a
regime they believe is oppressive. They may condemn such a regime
through active resistance, stated neutrality, silence, or refusal to enter
military service. They may even have hostile opinions attributed to
them that are not their own. In each case, they are vulnerable to per-
secution by the government or other forces that the government can-
not or will not control. To escape this threat, some of these persons
seek refuge in the United States. They hope for protection from a gov-
ernment that espouses democracy, civil rights, and judicial impartial-
ity. Instead, they are confronted with a standard that, while intended
to address their plight, is applied in an inconsistent and frequently
ungenerous manner.
To receive asylum in the United States, persons must show that they
are "refugees." They do so by demonstrating fear of persecution on
account of political opinion, race, religion, nationality, or social group
membership. The most common basis for an asylum claim is political
opinion. However, there is no consistently applied interpretation of
"persecution on account of political opinion" in United States law.
An appropriate construction of the term would consider its develop-
ment in the historical context of refugee law. This Comment explores
the spirit of international instruments and interpretive materials, as
well as United States legislative history behind the Refugee Act of
1980.1 An analysis of these materials will provide a more accurate
interpretation of "persecution on account of political opinion" and
present a clearer picture of a "refugee."
1. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) ("Refugee Act") (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101(a)(42), 1157-59, 1253(h), 1521-24 (1982)) (amending the Immigration and Nationality
Act, ch. 477, §§ 101(a), 207, 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 166, 181, 214 (1952) ("INA")).
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I. CURRENT UNITED STATES LAW AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ORIGINS OF THE DEFINITION
OF "REFUGEE"
A. The Refugee Act of 1980
The Refugee Act of 1980 (Refugee Act) governs asylum procedures
for refugees in the United States2 and establishes an overseas refugee
admissions program.' This Act defines a "refugee" as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in
the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwill-
ing to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion . .. .
The Refugee Act codifies the obligations arising from United States
accession to the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees ("Protocol").5 Congress ratified the Protocol to support
2. Aliens can apply for asylum, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982), or withholding of deportation or
exclusion, id. § 1253(h) (1982), in three ways. If the alien is already in exclusion or deportation
proceedings, then both applications are considered by the Immigration Judge ("J"). 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.3(b) (1987). If a judge has already ordered deportation or exclusion, then the alien may
raise the claim in a motion to reopen proceedings. Id. § 208.11. If no proceedings have begun,
the alien may apply for asylum to a District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service ("INS"); if the application is denied, the alien may renew it in exclusion or deportation
proceedings. Id. §§ 208.3(a), 208.9. The Department of State's Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs ("BHRHA") issues an advisory opinion on every asylum or withholding
application. Id. §§ 208.7, 208.10(b). The alien may appeal an IJ's decision to the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA") and subsequently to either a court of appeals, if the decision is
related to a final order of deportation, 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1982), or to a district court (often
through a writ of habeas corpus) in exclusion or other proceedings not directly related to
deportation. Id. §§ 1105(a)(9), 1105(b), 1329 (1982). Most aspects of BIA decisions are
deferentially reviewed. Id. § 1105(a)(4) (1982). For overviews of the asylum application process,
see T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 615-744 (1985); A.
HELTON, MANUAL ON REPRESENTING ASYLUM APPLICANTS (1984).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1982).
4. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1982). The Attorney General grants asylum status on a
discretionary basis. Id. § 1158 (1982). Persons are ineligible for refugee status if they "ordered,
incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of" race,
religion, nationality, social group membership or political opinion. Id. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (1982).
Applicants "firmly resettled" in another country are also ineligible. 8 C.F.R. § 207.1(b) (1987).
The Attorney General may terminate asylum due to changed circumstances in the alien's home
country. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982). The Attorney General must withhold deportation to a country
where an alien's life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality,
social group membership or political opinion. Id. § 1253(h) (1982).
5. Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force
with respect to the United States, Nov. 1, 1968).
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the international protection of human rights,6 then adopted an identi-
cal definition of "refugee" in the Act to codify its obligations under the
Protocol7 and further American human rights and humanitarian tra-
ditions.8 The Act implements an ideologically and geographically
neutral policy towards refugees,9 amending language in the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act that granted refugee status solely to persons
fleeing Communist or Middle Eastern regimes."l
The legislative history of the Refugee Act demonstrates that Con-
gress desired to create a humanitarian refugee policy with a broad
scope that conformed to United States international law obligations.
Although choosing to exclude persons displaced by civil or military
strife,'" Congress intended the term ."refugee" to include all perse-
cuted, homeless, and defenseless persons who flee harsh, tyrannical, or
oppressive regimes. 2 Political detainees and prisoners of conscience13
are also considered refugees, even if they were permitted to leave their
country of origin by their government. 14
6. 114 CONG. REc. 29,608 (1968) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
7. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1214 (1987); 126 CONG. REc. 4499-4500 (1980)
(statement of Rep. Holtzman); id. at 3756 (statement of Sen. Kennedy). For an analysis of the
legislative process culminating in the Act, see Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A
Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGo L. Rv. 9 (1981).
8. 126 CONG. REc. 4501 (1980) (statement of Rep. Rodino); id. at 3756 (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
9. Id. at 4507-08 (statement of Rep. Chisolm expressing hope that the Refugee Act as applied
would, in fact, be neutral).
10. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat.
911, 913 (1965) (amended 1980).
11. Senate bill 643 included as "refugees" displaced victims of military or civil disturbance,
arbitrary detention, or threat of persecution. Congress omitted this alternative in the final
version of the Act. See S. 643, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 23,224-25 (1979).
Commentators have suggested other avenues of relief for persons displaced by civil strife. See,
e.g., Heyman, Redefining Refugee A Proposal for Relieffor the Victims of Civil Strife, 24 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 449 (1987) (proposal to amend the refugee definition to include victims of civil
strife); Perluss & Hartman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary Norm, 26 VA. J.
INT'L L. 551 (1986) (explores temporary refuge as an emerging humanitarian norm of customary
international law for foreign nationals fleeing generalized violence and serious threats to life or
security caused by internal armed conflict); Comment, United States Political Asylum for
Salvadoran Refugees: A Continuing Debate, 8 Hous. J. INT'L L. 131 (1985) (proposing extended
voluntary departure as the best solution in light of the United States government's support for
the Salvadoran regime).
12. 126 CONG. REC. 4501 (1980) (statement of Rep. Rodino); id. at 3758 (statement of Sen.
Thurmond); 125 CONG. REc. 37,240 (1979) (statement of Rep. Derwinski mentioning regimes in
Cambodia, Vietnam, Haiti, and Eastern Europe as examples of oppressive governments).
13. 126 CONG. REc. 4499 (1980) (statement of Rep. Holtzman mentioning desire to protect
those persecuted and still within their own country, such as political prisoners in Cuba and
Chile).
14. Id. at 3757 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
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B. International Origins and Interpretations of the Definition of
"'Refugee"
1. The United Nations Protocol and Convention, the International
Refugee Organization, and the Inter-Governmental
Committee on Political Refugees
The Refugee Act's definition of "refugee" can be traced directly to
the United Nations Protocol15 and through it to earlier instruments
drafted in response to the refugee flows that culminated in World War
Two.16 The substance of the Protocol's definition and protection of
refugees is the same as the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees ("Convention").17 However, the Protocol is
more broadly applicable than the Convention. While contracting
nations applied the Convention only to persons claiming refugee status
due to events prior to 1951'" and had the option of aiding only Euro-
pean refugees,' 9 the Protocol removed these temporal and geographic
limitations on refugee protection. z
The Convention definition of "refugee" originated with the Interna-
tional Refugee Organization (IRO), which was founded in 1946.21
The IRO protected victims of Nazi, fascist or collaborator regimes
who had valid objections to returning home. 2 "Valid objections"
included persecution or a reasonable fear of persecution because of
race, religion, nationality or political opinions.23
The IRO's refugee definition garnered language from the 1938 man-
date of the Inter-Governmental Committee on Political Refugees
("IGCR").z4 The IGCR aided Germans and Austrians who had fled
their countries or who had not already fled but had to "emigrate on
account of their political opinions, religious beliefs, or racial ori-
15. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
16. For analyses and the history of international refugee law, see G. GOODWIN-GILL, THE
REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983) (includes asylum procedures in various countries);
Khan, Legal Problems Relating to Refugees and Displaced Persons, 149 RECUEIL DES COURS 287
(1976); Van Heuven Goedhart, The Problem of Refugees, 82 RECUEIL DES COURs 265 (1953).
17. July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. The Convention does not protect persons who have
committed a crime against peace or humanity, a war crime, a serious nonpolitical crime prior to
admission to the country of refuge, or acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations. Convention, art. 1, § F. The United States is not a party to the Convention.
18. Id. art. 1, § A(2).
19. Id. art. 1, § B(l).
20. Protocol, art. I, § 2.
21. Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, opened for signature Dec. 15,
1946, 62 Stat.(3) 3037, T.I.A.S. No. 1846, 18 U.N.T.S. 3 ("IRO Constitution").
22. IRO Constitution, annex I, pt. 1, §§ A, B, C.
23. Id. § C 1.(a)(i).
24. Established by the Inter-Governmental Meeting at Evian, France (July 14, 1938).
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gin . . "25 In 1943, the IGCR extended its mandate to all persons
affected by the European war who had fled "areas where their lives
and liberty [were] in danger on account of their race, religion, or polit-
ical beliefs."26
2. United Nations High Commissioner for-Refugees Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
The refugee flows that continued after the Second World War
prompted the 1979 publication of a Handbook on Procedures and Cri-
teria for Determining Refugee Status ("Handbook")27 by the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR").28
The Handbook offers guidance in determining refugee status to gov-
ernments that signed the Convention or Protocol.29 The Handbook
bases its analysis of the Protocol refugee definition on the experience
of the UNHCR, which includes knowledge of current national prac-
tices and literature about refugees.3" In acceding to the Protocol, the
United States agreed to cooperate with the UNHCR.31 United States
courts accept the Handbook as a persuasive guide, though not binding
authority, in determining refugee status.3 2
25. IGCR Res., para. 8 (July 14, 1938), reprinted in I FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES 756 (1938).
26. IGCR Res., para. 1 (Dec. 10, 1943), reprinted in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE-UNITED
STATES 237 (1943).
27. U.N. Doe. HCR/PRO/4 (1979).
28. The Council of the League of Nations appointed a High Commissioner for Russian
Refugees in 1921 to define the legal status of refugees, and allocate resources to, and undertake
relief for, refugees. G. GoODWIN-GILL, supra note 16, at 127. The 1950 Statute of the Office of
the UNHCR brought within its competence all previously recognized refugees, as well as
unprotected persons who had a well-founded fear of persecution because of race, religion,
nationality or political opinion. G.A. Res. 428 (V), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N.
Doe. A/1775 (1950). The mandate has been extended relying on the theory that the High
Commissioner's "good offices" can aid refugees who do not fully meet the statutory definition.
See G.A. Res. 1499 (XV), 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 19, U.N. Doe. A/4582 (1960). The
"'good offices" of the UNHCR have aided mainland Chinese in Hong Kong, G.A. Res. 1167
(XII), 12 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 20, U.N. Doe. A/3805 (1957), Angolans, G.A. Res.
1671 (XVI), 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 27, U.N. Doe. A/5018 (1961), and Indo-Chinese
refugees, G.A. Res. 3455 (XXX), U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 93, U.N. Doe. A/10,401
(1975), as well as many other refugees. The UNHCR's practical mandate now extends not only
to individuals who have a well-founded fear of persecution on specified grounds, but also to large
groups or classes that are unprotected by the government of the country of origin. G.
GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 16, at 11-12.
29. Handbook supra note 27, paras. (iii)-(vii).
30. Id., para. (v).
31. Protocol, art. II.
32. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 n.22 (1987).
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II. INCONSISTENT JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF
"POLITICAL OPINION" IN ASYLUM REQUESTS
Asylum proceeding outcomes depend, in part, on credibility issues
and standards of proof.3 3  Applicants' countries of origin may also
influence asylum proceedings.34 Studies show significant differences
among countries of origin in asylum approval rates.35 Over ninety per-
cent of final asylum decisions concur with Department of State Bureau
of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs advisory opinions.36
These opinions often reflect the ideological and national biases inher-
ent in any national foreign policy. 37
Inconsistent judicial interpretations of "persecution on account of
political opinion" further obscure the real bases for asylum decisions.
33. In asylum hearings, the applicant has the burden of proof. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.5, 242.17(c)
(1987). To meet this burden, the applicant must show a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of one of the five stated grounds. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982). A "well-founded fear"
involves the applicant's subjective beliefs and evidence establishing an objectively reasonable
chance of future persecution. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1213, 1217. Persecution is generally
considered to be a threat to life or liberty, as well as other serious violations of human rights.
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 n.22 (1984). The victim is singled out by a persecutor who may
be a government agent or an agent of forces, societal sectors, or the local populace that the
government cannot or will not control. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 n.2 (9th Cir.
1981). See generally, Cox, "Well-Founded Fear of Being Persecuted" The Sources and
Application of a Criterion of Refugee Status, 10 BROOKLYN J. INT'L. L. 333 (1984) (suggesting
that adjudicators should adhere to the "benefit of the doubt principle" in judging an applicant's
story and asylum claim); Sautman, The Meaning of "Well-Founded Fear of Persecution" in
United States Asylum Law and in International Law, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 483 (1986)
(deriving a generous interpretation of the standard from intentions of drafters of international
documents).
34. See generally Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act. An Unfulfilled
Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 243 (1984) (asserting that foreign and domestic policy concerns
jeopardize the neutral standards of the Refugee Act and the right to asylum itself); Comment,
Salvadoran Illegal Aliens: A Struggle to Obtain Refuge in the United States, 47 U. PITT. L. REV.
295 (1985) (suggesting that the political aspects of granting asylum to Salvadorans have
influenced the INS and the courts to interpret the refugee laws very strictly).
35. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BRIEFING REPORT TO THE
HONORABLE ARLEN SPECTER, UNITED STATES SENATE, ASYLUM: UNIFORM APPLICATION OF
STANDARDS UNCERTAIN-FEw DENIED APPLICANTS DEPORTED, (1987) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT]. The GAO Report found significant differences by country in 1984 asylum approval
rates. Id. at 15- 16. National comparisons revealed that while 66% of the Iranian requests and
49% of the Polish requests for political asylum were granted, only 2% of the asylum requests
from El Salvador and 7% of those from Nicaragua were approved during the same time. Id. at
34 (these figures did not include persons claiming to flee generalized civil strife). While the GAO
Report could not draw conclusions from these figures because most asylum decisions lack
documentation, the Report found no other discrepancy as striking as that of national origin. Id.
at 15-16.
36. Id. at 22.
37. The admission that a friendly regime violates international human rights obligations
embarrasses the United States and offends the ally. Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 567
(9th Cir. 1984); Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 677 n.1 (9th Cir. 1968).
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Conflicting interpretations often arise when resolving the following
four issues: First, whether persecution during generally oppressive
conditions in a country can amount to persecution on account of polit-
ical opinion; second, what acts or opinions are political; third, what
reasons for persecution are political; and fourth, when criminal prose-
cution is a pretext for persecution of political opinions.
A. Persecution During Generally Oppressive Conditions
Federal courts of appeals agree that, according to the Refugee Act,
"persecution" requires the victim to be singled out by the persecutor.38
Nonetheless, not all decisions have concurred on the issue of whether
the singling out must occur as a result of the victim's political opinion.
The Fifth Circuit, in Coriolan v. INS,39 held that the asylum appli-
cants were refugees even though the connection between their persecu-
tion and "political opinion" was tenuous. The applicants were victims
of a Haitian government so exceptionally oppressive that it singled out
victims who did not hold minority political opinions and were inactive
in politics.' Other Fifth Circuit decisions have differed with, or nar-
rowly distinguished, the Coriolan holding, denying refugee status
when persecutors single out a victim for nonpolitical reasons.41 The
Ninth Circuit follows this latter view.42
B. Political Activities or Opinions
Adjudicators differ over what activities or opinions are properly
defined as political. Most asylum adjudicators have accepted as
"political" such activities as membership in a political organization, or
expression of a political opinion through party membership, political
38. See, e-g., Martinez-Romero v. INS, 692 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting the claim that
no alien should be sent back to a country where violent conditions prevailed, and requiring some
special individualized circumstances before withholding deportation).
39. 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977).
40. Id. at 1004. The BIA denied several Haitians' appeals for withholding of deportation
based on persecution on account of political opinion because their political opinions were the
same as those of the vast majority of Haitians Id. at 998. The court of appeals reversed and
remanded to reconsider the claims in light of an Amnesty International report on human rights
violations in Haiti. Id. at 1004. The court noted: "[W]e cannot believe.., that Congress would
have refused sanctuary to people whose misfortune it was to be the victims of a government
which did not require political activity or opinion to trigger its oppression." Id.
41. See, eg., Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 289-90 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 92 (1987). The Board denied asylum, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that the harm Campos-Guardado feared was based on political opinion. The Board
distinguished Coriolan as involving the extreme circumstances of the Haitian Duvalier regime.
42. See, eg., Espinoza-Martinez v. INS, 754 F.2d 1536, 1540 (9th Cir. 1985) (no objective
evidence to show that petitioner's alleged confinement was due to his political opinion).
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demonstrations, and propaganda distribution.4 3  However, deci-
sionmakers disagree over whether to broaden interpretations of "polit-
ical opinion" to include the victim's conscious choice of neutrality, or
the victim's silence or noncommitment.
The Ninth Circuit has progressively broadened its definition of
"political opinion." In 1985, the court recognized the victim's con-
scious choice of neutrality as a "political opinion '  in Bolanos-
Hernandez v. INS.4 5 A recent Ninth Circuit decision extended the
interpretation of "political opinion" still further to include a silent
neutrality expressed in a victim's noncommitment to the persecutor's
opinions.46 In Lazo-Majano v. INS,4 7 the court reasoned that a vic-
tim's silence constituted "political opinion" if the persecutor perceived
political opposition in it.48 The Lazo-Majano court also held that a
43. See, e.g., Garcia-Ramos v. INS, 775 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1985) (evidence of
membership and extensive activities in persecuted political organization); Saballo-Cortez v. INS,
761 F.2d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir. 1984) (applicant failed to show credible fear of persecution or that
he "belonged to any political organization or had taken any political position"); Zavala-Bonilla v.
INS, 730 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1984) (membership in anti-government union is "political opinion").
44. See Arteaga v. INS, No. 86-7124, slip op. at 345 (9th Cir. Jan. 13, 1988) (choosing not to
support guerrillas and to remain neutral in Salvadoran civil war constitutes a political opinion);
Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1987) (neutrality, manifested as lack of support for
the Salvadoran government, is a political opinion); Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509,
516-17 (9th Cir. 1985) (establishes presumption that government action is politically motivated);
Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407, 1413-14 (9th Cir. 1985) (refusal to join one particular side is
political opinion); Argueta v. INS, 759 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1985) (asylum granted despite
lack of overt manifestation of neutrality, such as refusal to join a side). See generally Blum, The
Ninth Circuit and the Protection of Asylum Seekers Since the Passage of the Refugee Act of 1980,
23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 327 (1986).
45. 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984). Bolanos attempted to remain neutral in El Salvador by
ending his association with a rightwing party and resisting pressure to join guerrillas. When
friends and relatives in similar situations were killed by guerrillas, Bolanos fled to the United
States and applied for asylum. The court noted that the United States accession to the Protocol,
the Act's legislative intent, and a desire not to limit asylum grants to extremists directed its
decision to grant asylum to "moderates who choose to sit out a battle." Id. at 1286. Bolanos-
Hernandez may have overruled the earlier case of Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285 (9th
Cir. 1984). In Zepeda-Melendez, a Salvadoran man lived in a house that guerrillas used by day
and government forces used by night. Zepeda was pressured by the guerrillas to join them but he
maintained his neutrality and then fled the country. Id. at 287. The court held that Zepeda-
Melendez faced the same danger for his noncommitment as other Salvadorans, and that the
danger did not amount to persecution on account of political opinion. Id at 290.
46. Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1435. In Lazo-Majano, a Salvadoran woman, whose husband had fled the country
for political reasons, was repeatedly raped and beaten by a sergeant who threatened to label her a
political subversive and have her killed if she refused to submit to him. Id. at 1433. The court of
appeals granted asylum because it found four political opinions held by or imputed to Lazo-
Majano: A subversive opinion "cynically imputed" to her; the imputed opinion that a man
should not dominate a woman which she expressed when she fled; her opinion that lawless
conditions in her country gave her no choice but to submit to persecution; and the political
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woman's imputed opposition to domination by a man, and her opinion
that lawlessness pervades a country, are "political opinions."49
C. Political Reasons for Persecution
Decisionmakers have reached unpredictable conclusions regarding
what reasons for persecution are political, not personal." In Campos-
Guardado v. INS,51 the Fifth Circuit held that the petitioner had been
raped for personal reasons, not for imputed political opinions. The
court denied asylum even though Campos-Guardado's rapists shouted
political slogans, opposed the agricultural cooperative that her uncle
administered, and murdered her uncle just before raping her.52
Campos-Guardado later discovered the identity of one of her rapists,
who threatened to kill her if she exposed him. The court held that this
threat of future persecution did not warrant political asylum because
the threat was not due to the victim's political opinions, but to the
persecutor's desire for personal safety. 3 In contrast to Campos-
Guardado's high threshold for determining political persecution, the
Ninth Circuit, in Lazo-Majano, 54 held that a sergeant who persecuted
a woman because she opposed his domination persecuted her for polit-
ical reasons. 5
D. Criminal Prosecution as a Pretext for Persecution
of Political Opinions
Decisionmakers have held that some criminal prosecutions are pre-
texts for persecuting political beliefs. In Kovac v. INS,56 the Ninth
Circuit held that a "police state" with sanctions for defection perse-
cutes citizens for their political opinions under the pretext of prosecu-
tion. 7 The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") reasoned
opposition imputed to her because of her silence and noncommitment to her persecutor's ideas.
Id. at 1435-36.
49. Id.
50. See, eg., Florez-De Solis v. INS, 796 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1986) (one issue was whether the
persecutors were creditors or guerrillas); Zayas-Marini v. INS, 785 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1986)
(despite applicant's status as an important political figure in Paraguay and disagreement with his
opponents' political opinions, applicant was threatened only when a personal dispute arose);
Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1978) (asylum denied in part because the motive behind
the Haitian secret police persecution might have been extortion, not political opinion).
51. 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987).
52. Id. at 289-90.
53. Id.
54. Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
55. Id.; see supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
56. 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).
57. Id. at 104. Kovac was a citizen of Yugoslavia.
403
Washington Law Review
similarly, in In re Janus and Janek, 58 holding that both a citizen's
flight from a country with closed borders and criminal sanctions for
defection are politically motivated. 9
Adjudicators differ on when to hold that military induction and
sanctions for draft evasion amount to persecution for political opinion.
Some decisionmakers have refused to evaluate the political actions of
foreign governments, while others have evaluated governments' mili-
tary purposes. For example, in In re Salim,60 the BIA affirmed that
the forcible impression of Afghan men and boys by the Soviet-domi-
nated government amounted to persecution on account of political
opinion.6' However, in Kaveh-Haghigy v. INS,62 the Ninth Circuit
refused to scrutinize the Iranian government's draft during its war
with Iraq, absent exceptional circumstances.63
III. INTERNATIONAL COMMENTARY ON THE
INTERPRETATION OF "POLITICAL OPINION"
Study of the international sources of the Refugee Act's definition of
"refugee" assists asylum adjudicators to determine refugee status
appropriately. The following discussion focuses on commentary pro-
vided by the drafters of international refugee relief instruments, such
as the IGCR mandate, the IRO Constitution, and the Convention and
Protocol. 64 This commentary emphasizes that the concept of "perse-
cution on account of political opinion" has been flexible. Authorities
faced with sudden refugee crises have interpreted the phrase to include
all persons in genuine need of protection from a range of persecutions
involving political policies and doctrines. The UNHCR Handbook
provides further persuasive authority for a broad interpretation of
''persecution on account of political opinion."
58. Int. Dec. No. 1900 (BIA, July 25, 1968). The applicants were from Czechoslovakia.
59. Id. at 876-77.
60. Int. Dec. No. 2922 (BIA, Sept. 29, 1982).
61. Id. at 313.
62. 783 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1986).
63. Id. at 1322.
64. The Protocol, an international treaty, became part of the supreme law of the land when
the United States acceded to it in 1968. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Interpretation of
international treaties may be facilitated by referring to preparatory work in order to more clearly
understand the final treaty. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 147 (1965) takes into account the following: purpose and scope;
circumstances surrounding the negotiation; drafts and other documents and official records of
deliberations; subsequent practice of the parties; and a comparison of texts in different languages.
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A. Inter-Governmental Committee on Political Refugees and the
International Refugee Organization
The members of the IGCR and the IRO commented sparsely on the
term "refugee." Perhaps they shared a perception of refugees, inspired
by circumstances during the Second World War. The members
assumed that most persons who fled their homes had valid reasons for
flight that were broadly categorized as either racial, religious, or polit-
ical.6" The French member of the IGCR indicated that "political
opinion" applied to people fleeing a range of situations with political
overtones, including people who "weren't acceptable any more to the
prevailing race or creed or political school."6 6 This member believed
that refugees who feared persecution on account of political opinion
included not only persons persecuted by the government, but also
those who disagreed with the government's policy of persecution, even
though the persecution was not aimed at them.6 7 In discussions dur-
ing the drafting of the IRO definition of "refugee," the Belgian United
Nations delegate indicated that refugees included political dissidents
who, for reasons of "political conscientious objection," did not wish to
return home.68 The Dutch delegation emphasized that refugees com-
prised all uprooted persons who objected to returning to their country
of origin.6 9 The American delegation agreed with this description.7"
B. United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees
The Convention definition of "refugee" synthesized previous defini-
tions in the IGCR mandate and the IRO Constitution. The Conven-
tion, drafted after the Second World War, was one more in the series
of instruments designed to legally identify persons commonly recog-
nized as refugees at that time. Acknowledging that refugee problems
were widespread, the Convention delegates chose to omit refugee cate-
gories based on a specific nationality and to adopt a single refugee
65. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
66. Remarks of Count de Saint-Quentin, Transcript of the Meeting of Officers of the IGCR
(Oct. 17, 1939), reprinted in 6 THE HOLOCAusT 39 (J. Mendelsohn ed. 1982).
67. The refugees from Germany and Austria fleeing to France were not only Jews, but also
Catholics and Protestants "who disagreed with the political doctrines of the German
Government." Id. at 40.
68. 3 U.N. GAOR C.3 (5th mtg.) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/14 (1946) (Belgian delegate
alluding to United Nations Charter's implied right to freedom of opinion as basis for refugee's
right to asylum).
69. 3 U.N. GAOR C.3 (Annex 3) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/15 (1946) (amendment, proposed
by the Dutch delegation, to the United Kingdom proposal concerning refugees).
70. 3 U.N. GAOR C.3 (Annex 5) at 55-56, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/20 (1946).
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definition that reflected the contemporary understanding of the refu-
gee problem.
The delegates agreed that, although the Convention should not be a
legally binding "blank cheque"'" with regard to future refugee respon-
sibilities, protection should be generously extended to all contempo-
rary refugees. While not all-encompassing,72 the Convention was
broadly humanitarian in extending protection and included a recom-
mendation that the Conve.ntion be applied beyond its strict contrac-
tual scope.73 In practice, nations applied the Convention to refugee
situations arising after 1951, as well as to the earlier situations it was
intended to address.
74
Crises compelling people to flee their homes continued after 1951,
and frequently arose outside of Europe. The ongoing and changing
nature of refugee situations accounted for a growing discrepancy
between Convention refugees and persons who deserved refugee status
in the eyes of United Nations delegates.75 In 1967, this discrepancy,
and the desire to bring the letter of refugee law in line with its gener-
ous spirit, prompted the United Nations to draft a Protocol that
71. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Statelessness and Related Problems, U.N. Doc. E/1618, E/AC.32/5 at 38 (1950) [hereinafter
Committee on Statelessness].
72. The Convention drafters rejected Yugoslavia's broad proposal to define "refugees- as
persons fleeing political upheavals or a broad range of reasons for persecution. U.N.
CONFERENCE OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES ON THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND STATELESS
PERSONS, DRAFT CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, Amendment to art.
I para. A, (Agenda Item 6), U.N. Doc. A/Conf.2/16 (1951).
73. U.N. CONFERENCE OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES ON THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND
STATELESS PERSONS, FINAL ACT AND CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES
Recommendation E, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.2/108, U.N. Sales No. 1951.IV.4 (1951). The
signatories envisioned that Convention refugees included victims of profound political changes
and systematic programs of persecution which were after-effects of earlier political changes.
Committee on Statelessness, supra note 71, at 39.
74. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. Both Austria and Yugoslavia extended
refugee status to Hungarians fleeing in 1956. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 16, at 116. The
Swiss extended protection to Tibetans in the 1960's. Background Paper Submitted by the Office
of the United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees oil the Development ill the Low of Refugees
with Particular Reference to the 1951 Convention and its Statute to the Colloquium Organised y
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace I(B) para. 5 (1965), reprinted in AS['.N-
AFRICAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES 306 (1966).
75. In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees stated that the Convention's dateline, see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
discriminated among groups of refugees. 3 U.N. GAOR C.3 (1447th mtg.) at 415. U.N. Doc. A/
C.3/SR.1447 (1966). Many UN delegates supported this observation, particularly as it applied
to the African continent where refugees were fleeing the political upheavals of collapsing colonial
regimes. See e.g.. id. at 420 (China); id. at 421 (France); 3 U.N. GAOR C.3 (1448th mtg.) at
426, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1448 (Yugoslavia); id. at 427 (Cuba): 3 U.N. GAOR C.3 (1449th
mtg.) at 431, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1449 (Iran); id. at 432 (Tanzania).
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removed the Convention's temporal and geographic limits to the defi-
nition of "refugee." 76
Modem refugees who meet the Convention and Protocol definition
nevertheless find it increasingly difficult to establish their status and
receive asylum in foreign countries.77 The circumstances of the adop-
tion and application of the Convention and Protocol suggest that the
difficulties the definition presents to current refugees do not stem from
restrictions intended by the drafters of the United Nations instru-
ments. 78  The commentary accompanying the adoption of interna-
tional instruments concerning refugees, as well as the consistent
broadening of refugee definitions over time, imply that the current def-
inition of "refugee" should be interpreted generously and flexibly to
conform to its sources. Those who drafted the IGCR and IRO man-
dates intended the term "refugee" to include persons who disagreed
with government policies or doctrines, and political dissidents with
conscientious political objections, as well as persons mistreated
because of their political beliefs.79 The Convention's drafters believed
that their definition applied to the majority of the involuntary Euro-
pean migrants who lacked government protection after World War
Two;8  the Protocol furthered this generous spirit by extending protec-
tion to refugees from all regions without temporal restrictions.
Regardless of how twentieth century instruments have defined "refu-
gee," the term has been construed consistently to protect people
76. The UNHCR reported that the discrepancy conflicted with the "universal spirit of the
Convention." 3 U.N. GAOR C.3 (1447th mtg.) at 416, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1447 (1966).
77. Many nations today have retreated from humanitarian ideals towards xenophobic and
nationalistic ones hostile to people who would be "Convention refugees" under a broad
interpretation of the term. The conception of refugees as a threat to social order, rather than as
victims of social disorder, is reflected in countries' decreased willingness to accept refugees from
first countries of asylum and in long-term detention measures applied to people with well-
founded fears of persecution. Winter, The Year in Review, in WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, 1986
IN REVIEW 2 (1986) [hereinafter WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY]; see also Rudge, Fortress Europe,
in WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra, at 5 (1986) (suggesting that statistical overrepresentation of
the number of refugees in Europe destabilizes public opinion).
78. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. A Convention participant wrote:
As one who has participated in the drafting of the convention, I can say that the drafters
did not have specific restrictions in mind when they used this terminology. Theirs was an
effort to express in legal terms what is generally considered as a political refugee. The
Convention was drafted at a time when the cold war was at its height. The drafters thought
mainly of the refugees from Eastern Europe and they had no doubt that these refugees
fulfilled the definition they had drafted.
Weis, Convention Refugees and De Facto Refugees, in AFRICAN REFUGEES AND THE LAW 15, 15
(G. Melander & P. Nobel ed. 1978).
79. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 73-74, 78 and accompanying text.
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commonly considered refugees by contemporary government
representatives.S8
C Handbook of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees
The Handbook interprets "persecution on account of political opin-
ion" by drawing on the considerable experience of the United Nations
High Commissioner's Office.82 The Handbook notes that persecution,
and even a persecutor's awareness of a potential victim, may have
occurred in the past or be a future threat.83 To determine whether a
person is fleeing past or potential persecution for political opinion, the
Handbook focuses on the general situation in the victim's country of
origin," the persecutor's perception of the victim's opinion,85 and
whether there is a causal link between past, or threats of future, perse-
cution and the perceived political opinion.8 6
The Handbook distinguishes between persecution for political opin-
ion and prosecution for politically-motivated crimes.8 7 The latter is
recognized as persecution for political opinion only if the criminal can
show that the prosecution is a pretext for punishing a political opinion,
or that the punishment is excessive or arbitrary.88
IV. PROPOSAL FOR AN APPROPRIATE
INTERPRETATION OF "PERSECUTION ON
ACCOUNT OF POLITICAL OPINION"
Discordant perceptions of the term "refugee" have resulted in
inconsistent asylum decisions in different eras and among different
courts. Decisionmakers in the United States now frequently apply the
Act's "refugee" definition to non-Europeans 89 from countries in the
throes of post-colonial turmoil9 ° and internal armed conflict.9 The
81. See supra notes 66-70, 73-76 and accompanying text.
82. The experience includes the practice of states, exchange of views between the Office and
various national authorities, and recent refugee literature. Handbook, supra note 27, para. (v).
83. Id. paras. 82-83. The Handbook recommends careful scrutiny of refugees "sur place."
persons who have become refugees while outside their country due to political events within the
country or their own activities once outside. Id. paras. 94-96.
84. Id. para. 42.
85. Id. paras. 80, 82-83.
86. Id. para. 81.
87. Id. paras. 56-57, 59, 84-86, 167-71, 174.
88. Id.
89. Presently, refugees fleeing Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Central America.
and Southern Africa dominate world attention. Refugees: A 1986 Overview 36 REFUGEES 19-28
(Dec. 1986).
90. See Khan, supra note 16, at 293.
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cultural, social, economic, and political structures that refugees flee
today are less familiar to adjudicators than the European situations
that refugees fled when the Convention was adopted. This may
explain why people who would have been recognized as "Convention
refugees" a few decades ago are denied asylum status by some courts
today.
92
Asylum adjudicators could harmonize discordant perceptions of ref-
ugee identity by interpreting "persecution on account of political opin-
ion" in a manner consistent with the congressional intent behind the
Refugee Act,93 and with the flexible interpretations of international
instruments, as revealed in pertinent commentaries.94 Adjudicators
could examine four factors derived from the UNHCR Handbook95 to
begin an appropriate interpretation. First, adjudicators could examine
relevant conditions in the country of origin in order to consider subse-
quent factors in this context. Second, adjudicators could discover
whether the persecutor noticed, or may notice, an expression of opin-
ion by the victim; or whether the persecutor attributed, or may attri-
bute, the opinion to the victim. Third, asylum adjudicators could
consider whether the opinion at issue is "political" within the context
of the country of origin. Finally, adjudicators could decide whether
the persecutor was or may be intolerant of the political opinion and
persecute the victim because of it. If these criteria are carefully and
explicitly 'applied to individual asylum cases, a more consistent and
appropriate interpretation of "persecution on account of political
opinion" will result.
A. Examine Relevant Conditions in the Country of Origin
Asylum applicants' situations can best be understood in the context
of the relevant conditions in the country of origin. These conditions
set the stage for victims of persecution to lose or forsake the protection
of their own governments and to apply for refugee status in foreign
countries. Circumstances relevant to asylum adjudications include
political, economic, and social factors, such as the structure of the
91. "Internal armed conflict" includes wars of independence, civil wars, and revolutions
which may become "internationalized" with foreign power involvement. Perluss & Hartman,
supra note 11, at 551-53.
92. See supra note 77.
93. United States refugee law has moved away from explicit ideological biases toward the
more neutral and flexible approach set out in the 1980 Refugee Act. See supra notes 9-10 and
accompanying text.
94. The United States agreed to incorporate the international interpretation of "refugee" into
domestic law when it acceded to the Protocol. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 27, 82-88 and accompanying text.
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nation's government, army, police, and judiciary, as well as how fam-
ily, friends, work, religion, and school interact in this particular cul-
ture. 96 Reports by neutral, well-respected sources, such as Amnesty
International, on conditions in the country of origin may help the
court determine the relevant circumstances of the case.
97
Exploring general conditions in the country of origin is a necessary
preliminary step but insufficient to determine an asylum case; refugee
status is contingent on whether an individual has been, or may be,
singled out for persecution for political opinion. 98 However, condi-
tions of civil or military unrest lend credence to evidence of the vic-
tim's past or potential persecution and loss of government protection.
Evidence of strife should not undermine an asylum applicant's case. 99
Flight from random violence during conditions of strife usually does
not render an applicant eligible for refugee status.1t ° However, vio-
lence that at first appears random may, on closer inspection, be
directed at particular persons suspected of harboring political opinions
that threaten the persecutor.1 These persons have a legitimate claim
to refugee status.
Thus, an adjudicator could begin by focusing on the relevant gen-
eral conditions in an asylum applicant's country of origin in develop-
ing an appropriate analysis of whether the applicant was persecuted on
96. Handbook, supra note 27, paras. 41-42, 53. In Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir.
1977), the plaintiffs fled persecution by the Haitian secret police. The court placed proper
emphasis on the entire oppressive political situation of the country, including the persecutors'
political status and power, in order to determine whether the persecution was on account of
political opinion. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
97. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 16, at 25 n.22. Department of State BHRHA advisory
opinions may violate the legislative intent to remove ideological discrimination from United
States refugee policy. The United States contracted through the Protocol to apply the
Convention provisions without discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or country of origin.
Convention, supra note 17, art. 3. To the extent that advisory opinions discriminate on the basis
of country of origin as a matter of foreign policy, their influence on asylum proceedings violates
United States obligations under international law. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
98. Handbook, supra note 27, paras. 44-45.
99. Id. paras. 39, 42. For instance, the Salvadoran conditions of civil strife in which factions
vied for popular support enhanced the credibility of the applicant's claim in Zepeda-Melendez v.
INS, 741 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1984), that he was persecuted for his neutrality. See supra note 45.
100. The Handbook requires that there be persecution. Handbook, supra note 27. para. 45
Congress specifically excluded victims displaced by civil strife from the Refugee Act's definition.
See supra note 11.
101. During Haitian civil strife in 1987, uncontrolled, anti-election forces terrorized the
Carrefour Feuille neighborhood where civilian groups had organized to protect voters. The
forces sought to punish the inhabitants for supporting the election process. Victims within this
neighborhood could legitimately claim that they were persecuted on account of their political
opinions, despite the superficial appearance that they were subjected to random violence See
N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1987, at 6, col. I.
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account of political opinion. This point of departure not only clarifies
whether apparently random violence may actually have been a sin-
gling out of individuals for persecution, but also helps the adjudicator
decide whether the victim's opinion was political within the context of
the country of origin.102
B. Persecutor Notices in or Attributes to the Victim an Expression
of Opinion
After establishing the relevant context for an asylum claim, the
adjudicator could appropriately examine whether the persecutor
noticed in, or attributed to, the applicant an expression of opinion, or
whether this may occur in the future. 103 Only the holder of an opinion
knows what the opinion is until it is somehow expressed to others;
moreover, the perception of the expression may inaccurately reflect
the real opinion. Opinions can be expressed through acts, failures to
act, spoken or written views, or through association with family,
friends, acquaintances, strangers, or organizations.
In an inquiry into whether a persecutor noticed a victim's opinion,
it is relevant to consider the victim's social position and whether the
opinion was important or tenaciously held."° It is especially impor-
tant to inquire whether the opinion has or will come to the notice of
past or potential persecutors if the victim expressed the opinion after
leaving the country of origin."' It is irrelevant, however, to inquire
into the motives a person has for expressing an opinion, unless inquir-
ing into the motivation behind the commission of a criminalized
act.'0 6 The requirement that the persecutor notice the opinion should
not be interpreted to mean that political refugees must be well-known
political figures; neither the Convention and Protocol nor the Refugee
Act support this narrow interpretation.10 7
102. See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
103. Handbook, supra note 27, paras. 80, 82-83.
104. Id. para. 80.
105. Id. paras. 82, 96.
106. Compare id. paras. 80, 82-83 (no mention of motives for expressing an opinion) with id.
para. 86 (relevant to examine motive pertaining to crime to determine if prosecution is
persecution).
107. The Refugee Act was not intended only to apply to public figures; Congress intended the
Refugee Act to extend human rights protection to persecuted, defenseless persons fleeing
oppressive regimes. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The Convention definition of
"refugee" evolved to meet the needs of ordinary, often apolitical citizens either in fear of Nazi
and Fascist persecution or in disagreement with their policies. See supra notes 65-70, 73-74 and
accompanying text. While the Handbook notes that the publicity surrounding a victim's political
opinion may help establish that the fear of persecution is well-founded, the absence of fame or
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Opinions can be attributed to persons who do not actually hold
them. In asylum cases, expressions of opinion by the victim can be
directly misunderstood by the persecutor °8 or the persecutor may be
misled by a third party who imputes an unheld opinion to a victim. If
a political opinion is sincerely or cynically imputed to a victim, the
victim may have a well-founded fear that members of the political
apparatus, or groups that the government cannot or will not control,
will persecute the victim on account of the imputed political
opinion. 09
C The Opinion Is Political Within the Context of the Country
of Origin
An appropriate interpretation of "political" in American asylum
law would take into account the varied cultural settings in which "per-
secution on account of political opinion" occurs. The definition of
"political" should be broad and flexible enough to accommodate all of
its reasonable interpretations; the Refugee Act"0 and the Protocol"'
embody the goal of protecting all persons who have a wide, though not
unlimited, range of political reasons for fleeing and not wishing to
return home." 2 An adjudicator could appropriately explore whether
the victim's actual or imputed opinion is "political" within both the
context of the country of origin and the perceptions of the
persecutor." 13
While "politics" and "political" are sometimes exclusively used to
describe civil government, these words are also generally recognized to
describe patterns of human relationships that involve control, influ-
notoriety does not bar the assumption of refugee status. Handbook, supra note 27, paras. 43.
80-83.
108. For example, the victim in Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.). cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. (1987), was raped by opponents of Salvadoran land reform probably because
they believed that she had expressed her support for land reform by her family association with
her uncle, the leader of an agricultural cooperative. Whether or not Campos-Guardado actually
supported land reform, her persecutors attributed support to her. Thus, the court could have
legitimately held that Campos-Guardado was persecuted on account of her political opinion.
109. In Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987), the political opinion of
subversiveness was cynically and publicly imputed as a threat to make Lazo-Majano submit to
her persecutor. While her actual persecutor knew that she was not a subversive and therefore
cannot be said to have persecuted her for her political beliefs, Lazo-Majano may have had a well-
founded fear that others would persecute her because they believed the sergeant's imputations of
subversiveness to her. The Lazo-Majano court could have appropriately applied the criteria of
persecution on account of political opinion by basing its political asylum grant on this reasoning.
110. See supra note 1.
11. See tupra note 5.
112. See supra notes 12-14, 66-76 and accompanying text.
113. Handbook, supra note 27, paras. 42, 80.
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ence, or power over allocations of spiritual values or material goods."14
"Political" relationships and opinions can be found in trade unions,
churches, universities, agricultural cooperatives, businesses, and other
types of organizations." 5
A difference of political opinion between the persecutor and victim
exists if the persecutor perceives, in the victim's actual or attributed
expression, a difference of opinion about aims or methods surrounding
distributive issues.116 Common activities with political overtones that
are likely to be persecuted by either governments or uncontrollable
forces include: union activities,117 strike participation,1 8 agricultural
land reform," 9 human rights documentation, and many activities at
the grass roots level.12
Persecution of a person for neutrality can appropriately be defined
as "political" persecution because persecutors may perceive refusal to
participate in political activities as threats to their power to control
outcomes. 21  The neutrality of a victim, manifested by silence and
noncommitment to a persecutor's views, as well as by stated neutral-
114. R. DAHL, MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS 3 (3d ed. 1976). See also BLACKWELL
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 391 (1987) [hereinafter BLACKWELL
ENCYCLOPAEDIA] ("politics" is "a process whereby a group of people whose opinions [about
ultimate aims or how best to achieve them] or interests are initially divergent, reach collective
decisions which are generally regarded as binding").
115. BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, supra note 114, at 391. The Handbook notes that agents
of persecution include not only government forces but societal sectors that the government
cannot or will not control. Handbook supra note 27, para. 65. This suggests that political
opinions liable to be persecuted may occur in sectors of society other than civil government.
116. These are issues concerned with allocations of spiritual values or material goods. See
supra note 114 and accompanying text.
117. See, ag., Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1984); see supra note 43.
118. Strikes are acts to influence or achieve change and strikers, whether voluntary or forced
participants, have political opinions attributed to them by opponents of the strike.
119. See, eg., Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 92
(1987); see supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
120. Human rights abuses have significant effects on the distribution of both material goods
and spiritual values within a country. Foreign investors and agencies may withdraw financial aid
from governments with documented human rights abuses. See, eg., 22 U.S.C. § 2151n. (Supp.
1987) (prohibits development assistance to governments engaging in gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights). Similarly, grass roots activities such as aiding and
organizing the poor may rechannel resources from urban to rural areas. See generally R.
CHAMBERS, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, PUTING THE LAST FIRST (1983) (describing
accumulation of resources and power in urban area and the difficulties of sharing wealth and
technology with rural areas). Thus, the opinions that human rights should not be abused and
that absolute poverty should be alleviated are "political" opinions to which there may be
substantial opposition from the government or uncontrollable forces within a country.
121. Thus, the holding in Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1984), that
persecution for political neutrality was not persecution on account of political opinion, is not
supported by accurate interpretations of "political opinion." However, adjudicators in Bolanos-
Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984), and Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.
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ity, may be perceived by the persecutor as a "political" opinion threat-
ening the methods, aims, or policies of the persecutor. However, in
this case, the adjudicator may wish to consider whether the persecutor
believed that the victim's silence was a political threat or whether,
instead, the persecutor took advantage of perceived passivity to perse-
cute a victim for reasons other than political opinion."' 2
Countries criminalize such acts as defection and evasion or deser-
tion from military or police service, as well as more common crimes.
If the government prosecutes an offender for a punishable act under
the laws of the country, and if the punishment conforms to the coun-
try's laws and to accepted human rights standards, the offender cannot
claim refugee status.'2 3 However, if either the application of the law
to the particular crime committed or the punishment itself is a pretext
for persecuting the victim's political opinion and is arbitrary, exces-
sive, or discriminatory, then the victim is a refugee.'22 An asylum
applicant who fears combat or dislikes military service is not eligible
for refugee status 15 unless the applicant can show that participating in
a type of military activity is contrary to his or her genuine political
convictions, and that the type of military activity is condemned by the
international community as contrary to basic rules of human con-
duct. 126 The Handbook notes that the adjudicator can investigate the
sincerity of opinions through exploring the applicant's personality,
background, and previous expression of opinions. The adjudicator can
1987), correctly interpreted the victims' choice of neutrality as a political opinion because their
persecutors perceived neutrality as threatening their political control. See supra notes 44, 45.
122. See, e.g., Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987); see supra notes 46-49.
123. Handbook, supra note 27, para. 85.
124. Id. paras. 56-59, 61, 85, 169-174. Adjudicators may apply both United States legislative
standards and accepted human rights standards that are found in customary international law.
Id. para. 60. "Evidence" of customary international law includes the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948), and the International Covenants
on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/
6546 (1966).
125. Handbook, supra note 27, paras. 167-68. Although the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights recognizes the right to freedom of thought and conscience, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes a government's right to conscript citizens for
military service. Compare Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 124, art. 18 with
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) art. 8 § 3(c) (ii), 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6546 (1966).
126. Handbook, supra note 27, paras. 170-71, 174. For example, a South African who flees
prosecution for refusing to serve in the armed forces on the grounds that such service enforces
apartheid is a refugee. Accord G.A. Res. 33/165, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 154, U.N.
Doc. A/33/509 (1978). Some commentators suggest that, considered separately, conscription of
a conscientious objector or conscription for a type of military action condemned by the
international community might each be grounds upon which to claim refugee status. Frelick,
Conscientious Objectors as Refugees, in WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 77, at 29.
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also take into account whether the applicant had volunteered for mili-
tary service, had been drafted, or had had previous difficulties with the
authorities because of these opinions.127
An appropriate interpretation of "political opinion" in asylum adju-
dications encompasses opinions about significant distributive issues.
Framing their inquiries with an awareness of the cultural context,
adjudicators could examine the victim's expressions of opinion and the
persecutor's perceptions of the expressions, before attempting to deter-
mine whether the victim's opinion might have been considered politi-
cally threatening by the persecutor.
D. Persecution Occurs on Account of the Persecutor's Perception of
the Political Opinion
Finally, an asylum adjudicator could appropriately decide that an
applicant had been or may be persecuted "on account of political opin-
ion" if the persecution occurred, or the victim has a well- founded fear
that it will occur, because of what the persecutor perceives as the vic-
tim's political opinion. 128 However, causation is difficult to show for
refugees who arrive with few belongings and little evidence of persecu-
tion; the Handbook recommends that adjudicators give the benefit of
the doubt to plausible refugee accounts of persecutors' motives for
persecution. 129
Persecution occurs when a person is intolerant of an aspect of
another. 131 Intolerance is the refusal to allow, permit, recognize or
respect another's beliefs or practices.1 3 ' Absent evidence to the con-
trary, a causal link between persecution and political opinion can be
established if a persecutor is intolerant of a political opinion attributed
to the victim, and subsequently persecutes the victim, or persons simi-
larly situated, or threatens to do So.132
The fact that a persecuting government allows the victim to leave
the country, or that uncontrollable forces allow departure from a
region, does not undermine the applicant's claim that the persecutor
was or may be intolerant of the victim because of a political opinion.
127. Handbook, supra note 27, para. 174.
128. Some asylum cases, such as Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987), have
confused the cause of the persecution with the result. Lazo-Majano's opinion that the generally
lawless conditions in El Salvador afforded her no protection from her sergeant rapist may have
been a political opinion that persuaded her to submit to the sergeant. But her opinion of general
lawlessness was not the cause of her persecution. See supra note 48.
129. Handbook supra note 27, paras. 196, 203-04.
130. Id. para. 80.
131. WEBsTER's NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 962 (2d ed. 1983).
132. Handbook, supra note 27, para. 81.
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Persecutors may allow political dissidents to leave in order to rid the
region of political threats. Governments or other forces may feel espe-
cially threatened by, and eager to persecute, dissidents who have the
courage and commitment to return to a dangerous political situa-
tion.133 If the victim's fear that the persecutor does not tolerate the
victim's political opinions is well-founded, then the court may appro-
priately conclude that subsequent persecution, whether actual or
threatened, occurs on account of political opinion.
V. CONCLUSION
Asylum adjudicators interpret "persecution on account of political
opinion" inconsistently, often to the detriment of legitimate refugees.
This definition of a "refugee" is found in the 1980 Refugee Act and
derived from the 1967 Protocol and previous international instruments
relating to refugee relief. These sources confirm that the definition
should be interpreted flexibly. The United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees Handbook distills substantial experience with refu-
gees and provides an appropriately flexible construction of
''persecution on account of political opinion." Such an interpretation
would include: framing the asylum inquiry with knowledge of condi-
tions in the country of origin, as revealed by neutral sources; establish-
ing whether the persecutor notices or attributes to the victim an
expression of opinion; deciding whether the opinion is "political"
within its cultural context; and determining whether the persecution
occurs, or may occur, on account of the political opinion perceived by
the persecutor. An appropriate and generous interpretation of the def-
inition of "refugee" upholds global ideals of human rights and adher-
ence to international law. This flexible construction grants to refugees
what most Americans take for granted: A government's protection
from persecution.
Linda Dale Bevis
133. Id. paras. 47-48.
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